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Emersonian Moral Perfectionism
An Alternative Ethics – But in What Sense?
Heikki A. Kovalainen
1 What  Stanley  Cavell  has  famously  dubbed  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism  –  or  simply
Emersonian  perfectionism  –  is  not  a  compete  theory  of  moral  philosophy  alongside
utilitarianism or deontology. Emersonian perfectionism, rather, seeks to get a grip of a
dimension in any moral thinking, less a hierarchy of what to value most in life, more a
sketch on how we come to value anything in the first place – probing the everyday quality
of my life and the state of my soul, the very rudiments of what it means to be a moral
subject. As a term, Emersonian perfectionism is misleading, inasmuch as it may conjure
up false connotations,  first,  of  perfectionism in the everyday sense of  the word,  and
second, of moral perfectionism in the standard meaning of the term.1 Among other things,
to  be  sure,  Cavell’s  Emersonian  perfectionism is  a  re-interpretation  of  the  standard
tradition of moral perfectionism, but the differences are so remarkable as to make it
somewhat  misleading to  stress  this  terminological  connection.  A fresh vision on the
hidden potentiality of human life, seeking its ultimate goal not in a perfection of society
to be understood as a telos, but in the perpetual goallessness of this-worldly life itself,
Emersonian  perfectionism  strives  for  perfection  only  in  the  simple  sense  of  endless 
perfectibility of each and every particular moment of our existence.
2 In  addition  to  the  difference  of  teleology,  the  thematic  emphases  in  Emersonian
perfectionism are divergent from the traditional ethical theories; instead of front-page
moral dilemmas often discussed in conjunction with traditional theories, what is at stake
are  questions  such  as  interpersonal  recognition,  and  the  related  difficulty  of  moral
conversion – seeing myself in another person, ready to take on the challenge of change,
relying on the exemplary friend to help me overcome my current self. First and foremost,
Cavell  intends his  outlook as  a  way into discovering the philosophical  uniqueness of
Emersonian thought; he asks us to take very seriously what Emerson has to say on the self
and its coming to itself. Emersonian perfectionism endeavors to make sense of what it
means to be a self,  and to do this it  cannot stay solely within the conventional sub-
disciplinary boundaries of philosophy. Indeed, the view resists any sharp dichotomies in
philosophy, a splitting of the field into ethics and ontology, for the question concerning
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the  fundamental  elements  of  our  self  belongs  in  some  ways  to  both  –  or  perhaps
ultimately to neither. Given the intertwinement of such thematics, it becomes apparent
how Cavell’s  reading of  perfectionism is  not  confined to the narrow framework of  a
particular author, essayist or a poet, and Cavell is more than keen on discovering related
topics  in  works  of  art  as  diverse  as  Ibsen’s  Doll  House  and  the  poetry  of  Whitman,
philosophers as seemingly distant as Wittgenstein and Heidegger.
3 In  what  follows,  my  objective  is  to  provide  an  overview  of  Emersonian  moral
perfectionism,  primarily  with  the  help  of  Cavell,  and  secondarily  with  the  help  of
Emerson and other classical and contemporary philosophers pertaining to the matter. I
will begin with introductory remarks as to how to position perfectionism with respect to
other philosophical thematics. Thereafter I will outline the senses in which Emersonian
perfectionism is not a competing ethical theory, how it differs from the standard versions
of moral perfectionism, and why it resists divisions of the field of philosophy into sub-
branches. How Emersonian perfectionism relates to its chief philosophical source, Ralph
Waldo Emerson (1803-82), will be my concern increasingly towards the end of my article.
To be sure, perfectionism is not the only interpretation of Emerson by Cavell, but it is in
many respects more important than his other views, finding its original formulation in
his  Carus  lectures  from 1988,  and  published  under  the  title  Conditions  Handsome  and
Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism (1990). The book and its various
strands of perfectionist thought have a fairly complicated, even a convoluted structure,
and one must thus be cautious with any attempts at treating the contents of the book
systematically and in a structured way – something I will to some extent attempt in this
article.2 Throughout my discussion, particular accents will fall on the perfectionist notion
of truthfulness to oneself, the related necessity to change, and how this may not be done
without  the  help  of  another  human  being.  Finally,  I  will  be  adding  some  critical
reflections on Cavell’s stripe of Emersonian moral perfectionism.
 
Clearing the Path: The Place of Ethics
4 Since the very idea of a perfectionist ethics may be somewhat difficult to digest – the way
in  which  it  should  be  kept  separate  from  ethics  conventionally  conceived  –  it  is
appropriate to begin the discussion of Emersonian perfectionism with introductory notes.
To  be  precise  about  the  terms,  Cavell  nowhere  explicitly  states  that  his  version  of
perfectionism  would  even  constitute  an  ethics,  strictly  speaking,  at  least  not  of  the
traditional stripe, and while the outlook has high ethical relevance, one should try to
explain how perfectionism finds its place in relation to the other realms of philosophy.
Let me begin with a couple of remarks on the relationship between perfectionism and
Cavell’s whimsical interpretation of skepticism – both of these among his key philosophical
terms.  To  start  with,  skepticism in  the  Cavellian  framework  amounts  to  the  human
tendency to reject the inherent finitude of the human condition, in a word, as the human
denial of the human, or in another formulation, an argument of the self with itself (Cavell
1990: 64-100). In Cavell’s own writings, the projects of making sense of skepticism and
sketching moral perfectionism remain unfortunately separate from one another, though
there are occasional attempts to bridge the gap. Permit me here to briefly outline, then,
my  own  interpretation  of  their  intertwinement  –  mentioned  here  to  highlight  the
coherence of Cavell’s project, at times hidden from himself.3
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5 In my interpretation, then, Cavellian skepticism and Emersonian moral perfectionism are
ultimately two complementary aspects of the same set of issues, one wearing the face of
tragedy,  the  other  the  face  of  opportunity.  Adding  to  the  above  characterization  of
skepticism as the human denial  of the human, another central notion for Cavell,  the
ordinary,4 provides the everyday context-bound criteria for putting up with skepticism –
though they cannot provide a definitive solution against it, as Cavell takes Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy to show. Moral perfectionism, in turn, consists in a redemption or a
recovery from this inherent split within the self, a real possibility of transcending it with
the help of a human friend, through an affirmation of the ordinary. To content ourselves
with a general manner of speaking here, skepticism appears thus to be a negative way of
framing  the  inherent  duality  of  human  existence,  while perfectionism  explicates  a
positive side to the tragedy, a feasible means of withstanding our human frailty.
6 To  further  facilitate  the  entry  into  the  thematics  of  perfectionism,  important
comparative insights might be garnered from the two great classics of the last century
close to Cavell’s heart: Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Why the two? Whereas Wittgenstein’s
centrality to the Cavellian project stems from his very early interest in the Austrian
philosopher;  Heidegger’s  appearance  in  this  particular  context  may  at  first  appear
slightly  arbitrary,  and Cavell  (1979:  131)  himself  calls  the association somewhat  of  a
coincidence.  But  the  apologetic  remark  may  cloud  the  sense  in  which  thinkers  like
Wittgenstein and Heidegger are essential to the perfectionist project. In short, without
denying any of their decisive differences, they do stand in a somewhat similar situation
regarding their respective stances toward philosophical ethics. What I have in mind is
that neither one of them had much to say on ethics by way of explicit commentary, yet
both of them have given rise to a host of reasonable studies in ethics, following them. Thus
philosophers like Cora Diamond or Iris Murdoch have made their name drafting a new
kind of ethics, sometimes bluntly dubbed Wittgensteinian moral philosophy, and authors
like Emmanuel  Levinas and Jean Luc-Nancy have done the same in the Heideggerian
footsteps, drawing attention to his “originary ethics.”5
7 I  am  using  this  admittedly  superficial  observation  on  the  history  of  contemporary
philosophy attempting to make sense of the way in which Cavell frames his perfectionist
ethics. I am not implying that Heideggerian original ethics and Wittgensteinian moral
philosophy would somehow be one and the same project; only that there are reasonable
strands of genuine ethics left out in numerous contemporary conversations on the theme,
and that perhaps both projects try to snap onto the deficiency. The key issue regarding
both,  and  arguably  Emersonian  ethics,  is  that  they  speak  to  ethical  issues  without
explicitly  addressing  ethics;  they  touch on something  crucial  to  our  ethical  conduct
without laying out ethical norms. They are not so much interested in the normativity of
ethics in the first place, for they seem to grasp that ethics has to do with something more
fundamental, perhaps something like an original encounter with the being of the world, a
genuine attentiveness to the particularity of our experience, rendering ethics possible in
the first place.
8 Such an outlook on morality may not be unambiguously called ethics,  at least not as
something  separate  from  epistemology  and  ontology.6 Cavell  notes  the  presence  of
“something like  moral  (or  religious)  urgency”  throughout  Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical
Investigations, and Heidegger’s Being and Time and What is Called Thinking?, yet he finds it
crucial that the ethical in these works is not “accorded the standing of a separate field of
philosophical  study” (Cavell  1989:  10-1).  In the Carus lectures,  one finds a somewhat
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stronger expression: “a tone of continual moral urgency or religious or artistic pathos” in
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Emerson, and Cavell again underscores the inseparability of
the theme from intersecting areas of philosophical concerns (Cavell 1990: 61).
9 While the notion that the different areas of philosophy are ultimately entwined goes to
the heart of Cavell’s understanding of perfectionism, he is not very careful to spell out
what such an entwinement exactly means. Regarding epistemology and aesthetics, with
his versatile references to skepticism and the arts, a connection is strongly suggested, but
his ties to ontology – in this narrow sense Cavell may have been a victim of the Anglo-
American legacy of Wittgenstein7 – remain somewhat vague. A similar vagueness plagues
his allusions to the “moral  or religious urgency” in Wittgenstein and Heidegger,  and
particularly the religious aspect is left to very little elucidation. Regarding the latter,
Cavell’s  remarks  are  mostly  confined  to  noting  the  surface  similarity  between  the
Emersonian  striving  for  the  authentic  life  and  the  Heideggerian  distinction  between
authentic  (eigentlich) and inauthentic  (uneigentlich) existence drawn in Being  and  Time
(Cavell 1990: 2; Heidegger 1927: 126-30).8
10 Whereas  a  comparison between Emerson and Heidegger  dwelling  exclusively  on this
famous pair of concepts remains ultimately somewhat superficial, it is useful for stressing
the sense in which the two thinkers are approaching ethical questions through forays
into different comportments and ways of  being in the world – rather than trying to
fashion  prescriptive  moral  theories  in  the  traditional  sense.9 But  the  Heideggerian
entwinement of ethics and ontology allows us to go further than Cavell here. In so far as
Being  and Time seeks to get  to the heart  of  fundamental  ontology understood as  the
encounter of Dasein with primordial being, it is neither “ethics” nor “ontology” narrowly
conceived, for it precedes divisions of the field of philosophy into such sub-disciplines.
His later texts commenting on Being and Time, for instance the Letter on Humanism, can be
very explicit  on subdisciplinary divisions in philosophy resulting in a loss of original
thinking (Heidegger 1946: 7-8). If the question of being (Sein) is ultimately connected with
our  inhabiting  a  world  (Dasein),  it  becomes  clear  that  ethical-existential  matters  are
omnipresent in ontology, or to use a more radical formulation, are ontological concerns
(Heidegger 1927). But Cavell goes no further than to suggest that the distinction between
authentic  and  inauthentic  being  opens  up  for  its  reader  a  possibility  for  genuinely
authentic being in the world.
11 Speaking of Wittgenstein’s perfectionism, Cavell is a little more explicit, but here too, the
final  interpretation  is  left  to  the  reader.  Cavell  refers  to  a  remark  recounted  by
Wittgenstein’s  friend,  doctor  Drury,  according  to  which  the  problems  treated  in
Philosophical Investigations are “being seen from a religious point of view” (Cavell 1989: 40).
This  somewhat  vague  comment  may  be  supplemented  by  some fairly  recent  studies
verging on a perfectionist reading of the later Wittgenstein.10 For Cavell, Wittgenstein’s
later thought provides an exemplary case of the argument of the self with itself:  the
soliloquizing philosophical narrator constantly questioning and seeking to make better
sense of his own philosophical suggestions (Cavell 1990: 64-100). To supplement this, we
may suggest that the Wittgensteinian refusal  to present definitive theses in his later
philosophy may be understood as a quasi-ethical striving for keeping the mind constantly
clear and fresh for a perspicuous examination of the surrounding world.11
12 With  his  allusions  to  Wittgensteinian  perfectionism  Cavell  seems  to  be  getting  at
something similar, but it is not entirely clear what he means with the “religious” aspect
here.  What  is  “religious”  about  the  view  is  perhaps  the  seriousness  and  a  certain
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unconditionality with which Wittgenstein approaches the problems, an uncompromising
insistence on keeping our seeing clear and attentive. Cavell himself has read Philosophical
Investigations  as  a  case  of  confessional  literature,  where  the  author  is  continuously
struggling  with  problems  bewitching  him  –  in  a  manner  somewhat  similar  to  St.
Augustine in the Confessions or Kierkegaard in his religious writings (Cavell 1958: 70-2;
1964: 217). The juxtaposition is not as arbitrary as it may at first sound, if we factor in the
incessant  striving  for  self-clarification  and  complete  sincerity  omnipresent  in
Wittgenstein’s book – and his profound admiration for authors such as St. Augustine and
Kierkegaard.
13 As in the case of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, a perfectionist ethics does not constitute a
separate branch of thought in the case of Emerson either (Cavell 1990: xxix; 1995: 28).
Like Heidegger, Emerson views the problem of ethics not as a question concerning our
ability to follow preordained norms, but as an existential issue going to the very heart of
how we should attend to our existence in the world; and like Wittgenstein, he is very
uncompromising in what he will say or abstain from saying regarding the proper conduct
and the level of attention directed at the world around us. For Emerson, the decisive
question in ethics is not how to justify my ethical actions, but quite simply: How shall I
live? (CW 6: f1860, 1).12 In Cavell’s formulation, Emerson differs from other philosophers in
asking  “the  philosophical  mood  so  purely,  so  incessantly,  giving  one  little  other
intellectual amusement or eloquence or information, little other argument or narrative
[…] save the importance of philosophy, of thinking itself” (Cavell 1980: 152). I like this
formulation were  it  not  for  the  somewhat  excessive  emphasis  on the  importance  of
philosophy understood as thinking: philosophy for Emerson, to the contrary, is always
entwined with the concrete reality of life, and stressing the importance of thinking may
unnecessarily deemphasize this aspect.13
14 In Emersonian philosophy, “the importance of thinking” means incessant striving for
honesty and sincerity, such that life would become real here and now. “To finish the
moment, to find the journey’s end in every step of the road, to live the greatest number of
good hours, is wisdom” (CW 3: exp 1844, 35). Each moment of human life is an ethical one,
because each moment we can see or fail to see. To borrow an expression from the later
Wittgenstein (1953: §1), also evoked by Cavell, the explanations in Emerson’s philosophy
“come to an end,” ideally at each moment (Cavell 1989: 116). When a philosopher places
emphasis on ordinary experiences, the ultimate implication is that all experiences will
become philosophically and morally significant. “To the poet, to the philosopher, to the
saint,  all  things  are  friendly and sacred,  all  events  profitable,  all  days  holy,  all  men
divine” (CW 2: hist 1841, 8). This sentence from Emerson’s “History” provided the motto
for the first edition of Nietzsche’s Gay Science – though he was careful to efface the word
‘saint’  (Nietzsche 1882: 343; Kaufmann 1974: 7-8) – and we may take the aphorism as
emblematic for much of what is essential to Emerson’s and Nietzsche’s ethico-ontological
thought.
15 The  question  of  ethics  and  ethical  conduct,  then,  finds  a  somewhat  unconventional
orientation  in  Emersonian  perfectionism.  In  a  sense,  Cavell’s  project  abandons  the
traditional  notion of  ethics,  at  least  conventionally  understood,  and in  doing  this  it
deliberately blends the boundaries between ethics and other fields of philosophy. In such
a reading, the domain of ethics crucially overlaps not only the fields of aesthetics and
epistemology, but also Cavell’s views on language and thinking, our incessant need to
clarify our words, which is in itself an ethical act since it has to do with our personal
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stake at the words we use and speak. Thus philosophical thinking as such appears in some
important ways ineliminably ethical, and in his book Cities of Words Cavell goes so far as to
call perfectionism “the moral calling of philosophy” (Cavell 2004: 2). This implies that we
have a quasi-ethical stake at any philosophical words we use. Cavell’s later book is explicit
in linking his views on perfectionism with his philosophy of the ordinary, suggesting that
Emersonian  perfectionism  ultimately  renders  possible  an  altered  relationship  to  the
world as manifested by the ordinary phenomena of our lives (Cavell 2004). Cavell (1990:
46) stresses how such philosophical concerns are somewhat removed not only from ethics
understood as moral theories but also reasoning understood as argumentation. What he
calls  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism  is  thus  his  response  to  the  above  quoted
Emersonian notion of “wisdom, or living the greatest number of good hours, as finding
the journey’s end in every step of the road (a description at once of a good way of life and
of thinking – philosophy as journey)” (Cavell 1989: 10-1, 114).
 
The State of my Soul
16 In order to gain a closer perspective into Emersonian moral perfectionism, the next task
confronting us is to make sense of the way in which perfectionism is not a competing
moral  theory  in  ethics.  In  various  introductory  books  on  moral  philosophy,  we  are
accustomed to finding a host of different theories, such as utilitarianism, deontology,
virtue ethics, and libertarian ethics, and their advantages and disadvantages weighed in
and discussed. The common feature shared by many of these theories is that they take
some things, for example, the consequences of our actions, as the most relevant factor
deciding the morality of those actions, while placing less weight on some other things,
emphasized  in  turn  by  other  theories.  But  before we  can  properly  explain  why
Emersonian perfectionism does not neatly align with such theories, we must brush one
possible  misunderstanding  aside:  that  perfectionism might  mistakenly  be  taken for  a
theory in ethics alongside other theories. Indeed, one of the reasons why Cavell wants to
hang onto the term ‘perfectionism’ is that he wants to reinterpret the tradition of moral
perfectionism, which in the standard sense would refer to an ethical theory, and such a
standard interpretation of perfectionism forms the general background to which he is
responding with his work on perfectionism.
17 Among  various  other  matters,  Cavell’s  lectures  on  perfectionism  constitute  a
counterargument against John Rawls’s discussion of perfectionism in his contemporary
classic  Theory  of  Justice,  where  the  author  in  one  late  chapter  takes  up  varieties  of
perfectionism, arguing against their compatibility with democracy (Rawls 1971: 325-32;
Cavell 1990: 3-4). The chapter distinguishes between a moderate and a strong version of
perfectionism, and since a rejection of the former suffices for the rejection of the latter, it
will  be  enough for  my purposes  as  well:  “the  sole  principle  of  a  teleological  theory
directing  society  to  arrange  institutions  and  to  define  the  duties  and  obligations  of
individuals so as to maximize the achievement of human excellence in art, science and
culture” (Rawls 1971: 325).14 According to this view, perfectionism is a theory alongside
other  theories  in  ethics,  singling  out  the  maximization  of  human  excellence  as  the
decisive  factor  in  making  moral  decisions.  It  is  precisely  such  an  understanding  of
perfectionism that the Cavellian-Emersonian version resists, on at least three fronts.
18 To  mention  the  clearest  point  of  difference  first,  Cavell  vehemently  opposes  the
interpretation  of  perfectionism as  something  inherently  elitist;  on  the  contrary,  the
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opening question of  his  lectures (to which he will  respond negatively)  is  directed at
Rawls:  “Is Moral Perfectionism inherently elitist?” (Cavell  1990:  1).  In contrast to the
Rawlsian critique of perfectionism, Cavell strives to show that Emersonian perfectionism is
compatible  with  democracy,  and  in  bringing  throughout  his  lectures  Emersonian
perfectionism closer  to  the  Nietzschean version in  his  Untimely  Meditations  –  Rawls’s
paradigm example of elitist perfectionism – he goes against the hotly debated issue of
Nietzsche allegedly defending the elitist  idea of  human individuals living but for the
production of great geniuses.15 The Emersonian perfectionist pays attention to the state
of  soul  of  an  individual,  and  this  perspective  makes  up  an  essential  component  of
democracy.  For there to be genuine democracy,  society must be composed of human
beings, with their own distinctive voices, own selves, and thus Emersonian perfectionism,
so far as it functions as an internal critique of democracy, enables rather than disables
democracy.16 Furthermore, as an outlook on life Emersonian perfectionism is open to
each and everyone of us: all people may lead an Emersonian-perfectionist life.
19 More importantly, Emersonian perfectionism stands apart from the standard meaning of
moral perfectionism in not being a teleological theory (Cavell 1990: 48; 2004: 222). This is to
say that perfection is not a final state or a goal waiting to be realized somewhere in the
future,  not  a  fixed  telos  orienting  all  our  attempts  to  come  closer  to  it:  a  crucial
component of the perfectionist life is its goallessness (Cavell 2004: 3, 13; Saito 2001: 395).
Thus we may not say that Emersonian perfectionism is concerned with human excellence,
or such-like values singled out from others; what matters is the particularity of the moral
situations  we  find  ourselves  in,  and  this  will  decide  what  to  value  in  each  case.
Emersonian  perfectionism  appears  again  sharply  distinct  from  perfectionism  in  the
everyday sense of the word: whereas a perfectionist, say, in singing may realistically hope
to attain perfect pitch through rigorous practice, such a notion of absolute perfection
makes no sense in perfectionist ethics.17
20 If there is no teleology whatsoever involved, then every particular moment is an end in
itself; goallessness, as it were, turns into a goal in itself; “each state of the self is, so to
speak, final,” or using elsewhere a different formulation in conjunction with the word
“perfect,” “each state constitutes a world” (Cavell 1990: 3, 12). At each particular moment
the self experiences not only a particular perspective into the world, but the world as it
were in its entirety, so far as the world appears to the self. In a way, this is a logical
consequence of the ethical notion of the endless perfectibility of each particular moment.
Perfectibility confronts us as an endless task, the same one over and over again: that each
moment be perfect. Thus the Emersonian perfectionist has only one goal, to manage to
live on amidst the goallessness of life itself; when each moment of life is already complete
in itself, there are no reasons for aspiring after goals transcendent to life itself.18
21 Thirdly,  to  push the distinction between the two versions  of  perfectionism one step
further, we may elucidate the sense in which Emersonian perfectionism is not really an
ethical theory at all. Aside the obvious point that Cavell’s version of perfectionism is not
intended to be set alongside competing theories in moral philosophy, let me now explain
what its not being a theory might mean. One possible answer would be that there is no
closed list of characteristics, let alone premises, arguments or conclusions, that would
make up the outlook of Emersonian perfectionism; indeed, as Cavell himself repeatedly
insists, his stripe of perfectionism is open to revision (Cavell 1990: 4-5; 2004: 14). Another
line  of  answer  might  set  out  from the  view that  Emersonian perfectionism is  not  a
fictional model of how we might theoretically construe our being a self in the world;
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rather,  it  amounts to a description of  the fundamental  aspects  of  our existence that
cannot be done away with.
22 But different arguments may be presented against the latter view at the outset; we might
retort that any (no matter how allegedly foundational) description of the fundamental
aspects of our existence will be normatively charged and value-laden, for any description
will have to make choices as to which terms to prefer over other terms, which things to
highlight over other things. Furthermore, Emersonian perfectionism itself toys with the
notion of  utopia,  another fictional  world towards which our being in the real  world
aspires after, thus indirectly amounting to something more than a mere description. In a
word, no purely realistic description of our being a self in the world is possible;  any
description is also a utopia, an expression of an ideal.
23 I  am mentioning the two possible ways of  resisting being called a theory (the open-
endedness and the descriptive character of Emersonian perfectionism) because I think
Cavell oscillates somewhere between the two options. At any rate, he seems to consider
his version of moral perfectionism of such decisive importance that any moral theory
must take it into account. He considers the focus of perfectionism on the everyday quality
of human life to be more primary than the various factors esteemed in competing moral
theories. Like many a reasonable critic of contemporary moral philosophy, he opposes
the tendency of philosophers to spend disproportionately much time in discussing what
he calls “front-page moral dilemmas” (Cavell 2004: 11), such as euthanasia or abortion,
forgetting one of the most fundamental questions in ethics, concerning the quality of our
everyday lives. For Cavell, the latter question deserves a place in any moral theory, and
he notes the pertinence of the matter in the long history of philosophy (Cavell 1990: 62;
2004: 11, 24).
24 Emersonian perfectionism, then, is “something like a dimension or tradition of the moral
life that spans the course of Western thought and concerns what used to be called the
state of one’s soul” (Cavell 1990: 2). Such a call for critical self-scrutiny perhaps partly
explains why Cavell sees perfectionism not as an ethical theory but as a precondition for
ethics to begin with.19 The idea, we may suppose, is that philosophy as such contains
within itself an ethical challenge: it calls on us to examine ourselves, and to change the
course of our lives if needed. A certain responsiveness transcending specific allegiances
to morally charged ways of prioritizing certain things over others is needed before an
authentic ethical life becomes possible in the first place.
25 And  here  I  reach  the  occasion  for  my  first  serious  criticism  against  Cavell:  if  the
perfectionist project concerns before all my life, my coming to myself, how could it really
count  as  a  full-fledged  ethics,  which  first  and  foremost  should  make  much  of  our
responsibilities for one another?20 This is one of the problematic issues at the heart of
Emersonian perfectionism. Before proceeding to give a more detailed answer with the
help of Cavell’s reading of Emerson, let me suggest some general pathways as to how one
might get closer to finding an answer. In the first place, the weight of our responsibility
for ourselves is not ultimately contingent on our ability or inability to genuinely attend to
the suffering of others, since genuine empathy presupposes a certain minimum of self-
love – in line with the classical view of Aristotle’s Ethics of the friend as “another myself”21
– while the reverse (that loving ourselves would presuppose loving others) may not hold.
Cavell  appears  to  think,  indeed,  that  our  obligations  towards  ourselves  are  in  some
important ways more fundamental than those towards others; thus truthfulness towards
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oneself unveils itself as perhaps the most essential single feature of perfectionism (Cavell
1990: 1).
26 Such a view may be criticized on the grounds that it misses the dialectical nature of self-
love, how self-recognition is not possible without recognition from others, seeming to
grasp only  one side  of  the  matter.  Thus  somewhere  along the  lines  of  the  Hegelian
understanding of the fundamental reciprocity of human recognition, we might insist that
our being self-conscious subjects is not possible in the first place without a mirroring
relationship with another self-consciousness.22 Of course, such a notion runs in a circle,
though hopefully  not in  a  vicious  one:  our  being  able  to  give  recognition to  others
presupposes  our  being  moral  subjects,  which  in  turn  presupposes  recognition  from
others… Here we are facing what might be termed the paradox of our being with others,
and pressed to take a stance one way or another, I would incline toward a Hegelian rather
than a Cavellian view on the matter. Permit me next to have a look at the issue in the
light of Emerson’s essays.
 
Self against World
27 In my sketch so far, the most essential characteristics of perfectionism have turned out to
be the individual responsibility for one’s self, and the related necessity to change our
lives if needed. At times Cavell will take the truthfulness towards oneself to consist in
responsiveness to the humanity in oneself; thus he is keen on quoting Emerson’s simple
statement “I will stand here for humanity” (CW 2: sr 1841, 35) as exemplifying both the
realization of one’s humanity within and standing for such a feat before others (Cavell
1990: 1, 9). It is remarkable, then, that Cavell’s version of perfectionism captures at once
the high classical ideal of being and becoming human, as well as the versatile and less
flattering obstacles that such a project inevitably comes up against in the modern world
of confusion and constraint. It must not be forgotten, indeed, that besides being a positive
outlook on life, Cavellian perfectionism diagnoses some of the most persistent threats
before our journey for  self-realization:  the looming adulthood cynicism,  our internal
resistance to change, the inescapable fear of being ashamed of our own condition and
frailty, and the leveling tendency of human society and culture. “Why is this perpetual
pain preferred to the pain of turning?” (Cavell 1990: xxxi) – this is one of Cavell’s most
moving rhetorical  questions touching upon the ethically important problem of moral
sloppiness. But the pain delivers a promise. “It is today that you are to […] waken and to
consecrate yourself  to culture,  […] to domesticate it  gradually,  which means bring it
home, as part, now, of your everyday life” (Cavell 1990: 55).
28 Thus we find at the core of perfectionism a two-fold relationship to the world around us:
At best, the intersubjective reality of human relationships is not only the ultimate reserve
of beauty in our lives but also our primary impetus for self-overcoming; at worst, it is
precisely what keeps us from changing, or at least makes it more difficult for us to see the
real possibility of conversion. Cavell expresses this by suggesting that our quarrel with
the world need not be settled: “It is a condition in which you can at once want the world
and want it to change” (Cavell 2004: 18). In Emerson’s essays, such ambivalence towards
the surrounding world comes across with particular force in “The American Scholar” –
one of Cavell’s central points of reference in his discussion of perfectionism – where the
word “culture”  ceases  to  be  the emblem for  our  inability  to  ever  become ourselves,
transforming itself into the very engine of our personal revolution. Emerson calls on us at
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once to try and appropriate as much as possible in the world,  yet use the resources
provided by the world and our own private lives to fashion a revolution, not a mere
remaking  of  the  existent  order.  “This  revolution  is  to  be  wrought  by  the  gradual
domestication of the idea of Culture. The main enterprise of the world for splendor, for
extent, is the upbuilding of a man” (CW 1: ams 1837, 65). The word upbuilding, as Cavell
(1989:  8-9)  perceptively  notes,  virtually  rhymes the German epitome for  self-culture,
Bildung, which thus becomes nearly synonymous with Cavell’s perfectionist project.
29 But as the citations from Cavell indicate, his notion of Bildung is more radical than many
an Enlightenment aesthetic ideal would allow for: oftentimes the very project of self-
culture begins with our very admitting of having gone astray, and we use our being lost as
the  impetus  for  real  self-reliance.  Indeed,  the  impulse  for  genuine  culture  is  often
stronger than the imperatives of society, and if  society threatens to suffocate human
culture, we must turn against society. Perfectionism envisages “the soul as on a journey
(upward or onward)  that  begins by finding oneself  lost  to the world,  and requires a
refusal  of  society,  perhaps  above  all  of  democratic,  leveling  society,  in  the  name of
something often called culture” (Cavell 1990: 1).
30 While Cavell  will  find such a thematics of  getting lost  as a precondition for genuine
change in works as versatile as Dante’s  Divine Comedy and Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical
Investigations (Cavell  1990:  5),  its  attentive articulation and extensive thematization is
perhaps one of the most original features of his own whimsical version of perfectionism.
As regards Emerson, I am not fully convinced that Cavell’s reference to the beginning of
“Experience,” “Where do we find ourselves?” (CW 3: exp 1844, 27), would itself constitute
a substantial argument for him having had a similar idea, though other Emersonian texts
omitted  by  Cavell  may  perhaps  provide  more  support  for  the  view.23 Regarding  the
theme, I am more impressed by his allusions, say, to the Hollywood genre of remarriage,
and  in  particular  The  Philadelphia  Story  (1940)  –  the  female  protagonist  Tracy  Lord’s
journey into finding herself and the genuine love for her husband through an impressive
display of first losing hold of herself, then coming to understand her own frailty, itself a
theme that Mrs. Lord will learn to appreciate only after losing her way in the course of
the film.24 The general implication is incisive: we should trust ourselves not only when we
have a strong hold of who we feel to be, but also and perhaps particularly when our selves
seem to be abandoning us, plunging us into the darkness of well-nigh self-betrayal.
31 As a reading of Emerson, Cavell’s references to his primary source are somewhat scanty
and often selective, but the references he makes are usually perceptive enough to allow
for idiosyncratic omissions amidst his versatile associations elsewhere. The central text in
Emersonian perfectionism is the essay “History,” the opening piece of Essays: First Series,
sketching the rudiments of his philosophy of history that exerted a direct influence on
Nietzsche’s  second  Untimely  Meditation,  “On  the  Use  and  Abuse  of  History  for  Life”
(Nietzsche 1874b). Emersonian maxims such as “What [the mind] does not see, what it
does not live, it will not know” (CW 2: hist 1841, 6) are taken for granted by Nietzsche’s
meditation,  where “knowledge presupposes life” (Nietzsche 1874b:  331).  In “History,”
Emerson essentially deals with the question as to how we should relate to the words of
others in our cultural tradition, how we should read works of history such that they
would bear maximum meaning for our lives. Cavell wraps his perfectionist reading of
Emerson around the following passages (I quote at somewhat greater length than he does,
to make the context of the text plain):
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All that Shakspeare [sic] says of the king, yonder slip of a boy that reads in the
corner feels to be true of himself. We sympathize in the great moments of history,
in  the  great  discoveries,  the  great  resistances,  the  great  prosperities  of  men;  –
because there law was enacted, the sea was searched, the land was found, or the
blow was struck for us, as we ourselves in that place would have done or applauded.
We have the same interest in condition and character. We honor the rich, because
they have externally the freedom, power, and grace which we feel to be proper to
man, proper to us. So all that is said of the wise man by Stoic, or oriental or modern
essayist,  describes  to  each  reader  his  own  idea,  describes  his  unattained  but
attainable self. (CW 2 hist 1841, 5.)
32 The  phrase  unattained  but  attainable  self  provides  Cavell  with  a  key  to  Emersonian
perfectionism. According to the interpretation, Emerson refers to himself by the phrase
the modern essayist, thus claiming to be “a path to one’s unattained self” (Cavell 1990: 8-9).
Note that we are here concerned not with Emerson’s self but with that of the reader; thus
what we find in the text through Cavell is effectively an example of Socratic birth-giving.
History and philosophy are not written for the mere leisure of collecting facts about our
past;  rather,  they provide representative examples of  what  we might do in a  similar
situation; thus the great events of history take place, in the Emersonian hyperbole, for us.
33 Here we may sketch a Cavellian-Emersonian solution to the philosophical problem of the
self versus other, and their respective weights in ethical situations: there need not be an
insoluble tension between the two, for giving voice to oneself, say, in a written text –
being truthful to oneself rather than others – may help others, the readers of the text,
discover themselves in turn.  Perhaps one difference between Socratic  midwifery and
Emersonian exemplarity would be that Emerson has no qualms about speaking of himself,
while  Socrates  was more insistent  on drawing out  only that  which is  implicit  in his
addressees. But the implication is similar; even Emerson’s speaking of himself will at its
best only draw out what is to be found in his reader.
34 Thus Emersonian perfectionism lays essential emphasis on friendship, the importance of
another human being, an exemplar, who helps me find myself.25 In this interpretation,
Emerson  himself  provides  an  example  of  another  human  being  for  the  reader,  a
representative  self,  and  elsewhere  Cavell  will  aptly  note  that  our  perfectionist
relationship to a text is emblematic of our relationships to one another (Cavell  1990:
xxix). Someone looking for himself might indeed discover, say, in a philosophical classic
another human being who represents to him his own unattained self, in a sense “is” more
him than he himself (Cavell 1990: 26). Of course, such a phenomenon is most famously
encapsulated in Emerson’s “Self-Reliance,” in whose opening paragraph in “every work of
genius we recognize our own rejected thoughts, and they come back to us with a certain
alienated majesty” (CW 2: sr 1841, 27). In another perfectionist passage from “The Poet”
brought up by Cavell, “the great poet makes us feel our own wealth, and then we think
less of his compositions, and his best communication to our mind is to teach us to despise
all he has done” (CW 3: pt 1844, 4; Cavell 1990: 26).
35 Two  important  conclusions  ensue  from  Cavell’s  observations.  The  first  is  the
quintessential Emersonian ideal of representativeness, a position multifarious enough to
carry connotations both private and political.  Indeed,  the notion of individuals being
representative for one another is one important sense in which Cavell sees Emersonian
perfectionism aligning with democracy, and it is apparent that the word “representative”
is used deliberately not so much to dwell uncritically on the political familiarity of the
notion, as to deconstruct the very term, trying to get to the heart of what democracy
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might mean in real human interaction. Thus a person becomes representative for and of
others not by virtue of the mere fact that she has been chosen to speak for others through
a democratic decision-making process, but only on the precondition that she discovers
her  own  voice  in  and  ever  after  the  process.  Both  Emerson  and  Cavell  seem to  be
experimenting with the ambiguity of the word ‘represent’, and indeed delving into some
later passages by Emerson on the matter (something Cavell would not do) makes it plain
how representing humanity for one another means also re-presenting for other people
the  real  events  taking  place  in  the  world,  translating  them  into  lively  metaphors
exemplifying our ideals.26 Ethico-political authority or exemplarity is thus gained only on
the grounds of full acquaintance with the world; we might say that ethics and ontology
appear  intertwined.  Cavell  underscores  repeatedly  how  Emersonian  perfectionism  is
about finding one’s voice, and only after finding such a language speaking at once for
myself and for the world can we become representative.
36 Dealing with Emersonian-Cavellian representativeness in the political sense, second, we
must keep in mind how the phenomenon is by no means confined to a limited class of
individuals,  but  rather  evinces  something  that  all  human  beings  in  a  genuinely
democratic society are constantly engaged in. Cavell seems to think, indeed, that we are
all educations for one another; in each one of you there is something further and foreign
for me to yet attain and become familiar with, as if we were all invitations for each other
to something greater than our current selves (Cavell 1990: 9). It is axiomatic in Cavell’s
version of perfectionism that people cannot renew and change themselves without the
help of an Other: it is another human being, a friend or a beloved, who gives me the wings
to flutter over the yawning gulf between my current and future self.27 In many cases
change  begins  with  an  encounter  and  a  conversation:  as  Cavell  wittily  remarks,
conversion often presupposes conversation.28
37 In  Ibsen’s  A  Doll’s  House,  for  example,  counted  by  Cavell  among  the  exemplary
perfectionist  works,  Nora and Helmer have never “had a serious conversation,” have
“never sat down in earnest together to get at the bottom of anything” before their turn-
taking encounter near the end of the piece. Once they finally confront one another and
speak,  Nora becomes aware of  her “[d]uties  to myself”  (Ibsen 1879:  105,  108).  In his
Emersonian  perfectionism,  Cavell  is  impressively  perceptive  in  drawing  attention  to
theme, yet he could have been more attentive in appealing to the various passages where
Emerson underscores the importance of not only friendship but also love. “Thus love
reduces the unjust inequalities between different people, as the sun melts the iceberg in
the sea. The heart and soul of all men being one, this bitterness of His and Mine ceases. His
is mine. I am my brother, and my brother is me” (CW 2: comp 1841, 72). Many of these
texts are not to be found in Emerson’s essays “Friendship” and “Love,” and many of them
remarkably blend in a Christian spirit the boundaries between me and you – something
that  Cavell,  perhaps  more  indirectly,  strives  to  do  as  well.  Let  me  now turn  to  my
concluding section with an eye on elucidating perfectionism with the help of related
discussions by other authors.
 
Positioning Perfectionism: Critical Reflections
38 I have been discussing the thematics of Emersonian perfectionism first with the help of a
Cavellian prelude comparing Emerson with Wittgenstein  and Heidegger,  then with a
commentary on the way in which Cavell frames his perfectionist ethics, with particular
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emphasis on self and Other, and on the bind between the self and the world. Having
explained the chief aspects of what I think is fruitful in Cavell’s interpretation, let me
now  move  onto  critical  reflections.  Before  doing  this,  let  me  however  stress  that  I
consider Cavell’s Emersonian moral perfectionism not only one of the best philosophical
interpretations of Emerson by any author, but a distinctively original ethical outlook in its
own right.
39 Let me begin, then, by mentioning my three main lines of criticism concerning the way in
which Emersonian perfectionism relates to Emerson’s original texts. First, Cavell’s quoting
of his chief source is selective, and does not always amount to a balanced reading of the
original  texts.  In  conversation,  Cavell  has  no  trouble  acknowledging  that  he  is  not
interested in a scholarly reading of Emerson; while the confession is admirable in its
honesty, perhaps even conferring him a certain degree of freedom in what he has to say
on the essayist, it must be taken as an invitation to further scholarly work that it is.29
Second, Cavell lays too little weight on nature as a source of Emersonian perfectionist
conversions. If a version of perfectionism is to set forth from Emerson’s texts – as Cavell’s
obviously does – then one ought to attend more fully than Cavell to the ways in which the
human self-overcoming is often decisively sparked by the constant and organic tendency
of nature to renew itself. To put the point bluntly, for Emerson the human perfectionism
is often subordinate to nature’s “perfectionism” rather than vice versa.
40 Third, despite passing references, Cavell ultimately shies away from the religious element
in  Emersonian  thought,  whose  importance,  though  difficult  to  articulate  clearly,  is
undeniable and most essential. Cavell’s hesitation to follow the glimpses of divinity in
Emerson’s writing, indeed, is perhaps the most serious shortcoming of his perfectionist
reading,  partly for the very reason that he variously hints at  it,  yet falls  short from
spelling out what the allusions exactly mean.30 The mystery of  the religious element
suggests  more  fundamental  worries  concerning  the  nature  of  perfectionism:  if  the
outlook  deliberately  blends  the  boundaries  of  literature  and  philosophy,  ethics  and
ontology, we may reasonably raise the question as to how one should ultimately position
perfectionism. Is it an ethico-ontological theory on the fundaments of ethical conduct in
the  world,  or  perhaps  a  synthetic  interpretation  of  versatile  themes  not  only  in
philosophical but also literary texts, or both of these in equal terms? Here the question
concerning the relationship between Emersonian perfectionism and Emerson’s original
essays becomes again pressing, since there are times when Emersonian perfectionism
should perhaps be considered Cavell’s rather than Emerson’s outlook.31
41 To  mention two  further  problems  in  positioning  perfectionism,  we  might  ask  how
Emersonian perfectionism stands with respect to contemporary moral philosophy. First,
how is Cavell’s perfectionism different from, say, Iris Murdoch’s version of perfectionism
in  her  book  The  Sovereignty  of  Good,  and  particularly  its  first  chapter,  “The  Idea  of
Perfection”? Murdoch is a reasonable exemplar for comparison not only because Cavell
himself mentions her book as one of the related discussions in his introductory notes to
lectures on perfectionism, but also because the more general bearings of her book stand
in an intriguing relation to the perfectionist endeavors of Cavell.32 As regards his own
positioning, Cavell admits his proximity to Murdoch, but refuses particularly to count
Murdoch’s well-known example of an inner conversion of a person for a case of moral
perfectionism, for that for Cavell would have to do with a fundamental change of the self
rather than a temporary overcoming of snobbery.33 But a critical reader might wonder
how we may distinguish between a fundamental and a temporary change in the context
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of Emersonian-Cavellian perfectionism, if we are giving up the very notion of a solid self,
as Cavell himself insists.
42 A more  substantial  difference  between  the  two  philosophers  may  be  found  in  their
respective stances  towards  the history of  perfectionist  philosophy:  while  neither  has
much trouble admitting their far-reaching debts to the tradition, Cavell is perhaps trying
to rewrite the tradition, while Murdoch is often very forthcoming as to how her project is
but an interpretation of classical philosophy, in particular Platonism. To speak in more
philosophical terms, it seems to me that the particular brand of ethics exemplified by
Murdoch is more willing to admit its ties to ontology, while Cavell’s attitude to ontology –
not to mention metaphysics,  which in the Anglo-American world often sounds like the
very scapegoat of philosophy – seems to be somewhat ambivalent, to say the least. Both
philosophers are in some sense Wittgensteinians, but Cavell seems to inherit more of the
quasi-Wittgensteinian repulsion to metaphysics, while Murdoch’s views on ontology are,
again, influenced by her Platonism. But in the Cavellian framework, such a resistance
easily  lands  in  a  contradiction,  since  the  very  project  of  trying  to  ground ethics  in
something more fundamental than conventional moral philosophy easily turns into an
ethico-ontological project. In this regard, it is no coincidence that Cavell’s perfectionist
writings  abound  with  references to  Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time,  though  oftentimes
somewhat  apologetically,  as  if  Cavell  were  aware  of  the  connection  but  had trouble
admitting the full extent of it.
43 Finally, we may meditate on the relationship of Cavell’s project to the other classical texts
pertaining to perfectionism throughout  the history of  philosophy.  Here one must  be
careful to keep Emersonian and standard versions of moral perfectionism apart: while it
is  obvious  that  moral  perfectionism  has  a  long  tradition,  the  ties  of  Emersonian 
perfectionism  to  the  history  of  philosophy  are  more  complicated.  The  standard
perfectionist  idea  about  truthfulness  to  oneself  and  of  taking  up  the  challenge  of
authentic existence can naturally be found in very diverse works, from Plato’s Republic to
Heidegger’s Being and Time and G. B. Shaw’s Pygmalion, as Cavell emphatically points out
(1990: 1).  While introducing the reader to Emersonian perfectionism, mapping out its
intellectual background, Cavell presents a list of works containing related ideas; the list is
open to revision, and among many of the works listed only a small portion, say, one
chapter or just a few passages, pertain to perfectionism (Cavell 1990: 5-6). He prepares his
reader for the list by imagining that there is “an outlook […] sketched out […] in some
imaginary interplay among [certain]  texts”  (Cavell  1990:  4).  After  this  Cavell  lists  66
works; I will mention here a truncated selection of those bearing most directly on my
discussion of perfectionism, without losing sight of the list’s versatility:
Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, The Gospel according to St. Matthew,
Kant’s Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mill’s On Liberty, Ibsen’s A Doll’s House,
Emerson’s “The American Scholar,” “Self-Reliance,” and “Experience,” Nietzsche’s
third  Untimely  Meditation  “Schopenhauer  as  Educator,”  Freud’s  Interpretation  of
Dreams, Dewey’s Experience and Nature, Heidegger’s Being and Time, “On the Origin of
the  Work  of  Art”  and  What  is  Called  Thinking?,  Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical
Investigations,  Schiller’s  On the  Aesthetic  Education of  Man,  Dostoyevsky’s  The Idiot,
William  James’s  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  and  finally  the  movies  The
Philadelphia Story and Now, Voyager.34
44 The works listed here make up approximately one half of the texts listed by Cavell, yet
the list is versatile enough to arouse some perplexity. In addition to philosophers, there
are works by psychologists, prosaists, poets, as well as two movies. On what grounds does
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Cavell list, say, Sigmund Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams or William James’s The Varieties of
Religious Experience? Arguably, both books deal with the “state of the soul.” Freud’s book
aims at delving into the depths of human psyche by interpreting dreams; in James’s book
there is a chapter called “Conversion,” which pictures a turning of “a sick soul” towards
religious experience (James 1902: 157-77, 178-209). Cavell himself mentions as an example
28 perfectionist features from Plato’s Republic (Cavell 1990: 6-7; 2004: 445-7).
45 Cavell  justifies  his  listing  through a  desire  to  bring  together  works  that  have  some
bearing on how we lead our lives, saying in essence that he wants “to call to mind a
fraction  of  the  play  of  voices  left  out  (‘forgotten?’)  in  characteristic  philosophical
discussions about how we might live, voices that will enter other conversations more
urgent ones to my mind, about how we do live” (Cavell 1990: 5-6). This leads me back to
the initial motivation behind Emersonian perfectionism: we seek to find in philosophy a
way of addressing ethical matters so as to make their urgency and pertinence fully visible
to non-philosophers and non-specialists as well as to philosophers. What speaks to us
most profoundly ethically, may not be ethics in the customary sense of the word. Cavell’s
eclectic  and  perfectionist  mapping  of  works  takes  up  the  Emersonian  challenge  to
appropriate and bring to life as  many works in our cultural  tradition as possible,  to
harness culture into a resource for life. In striving to introduce weighty moral questions
into philosophical discussions, Cavell takes part, in an Emersonian spirit, in the classical
quest for the good life with the help of philosophy.
 
Coda: Self as Other
46 Forming an authentic relation to the surrounding world, to our cultural heritage, means
appropriating  it:  becoming  what  one  is,  a  human  being  whose  thoughts  have  been
thought by others.  It  is  intriguing to note how such a thematics  figures in versatile
authors, while perhaps not being one of the key concerns of classical philosophers. Take
Goethe’s Faust: “If you would own the things your forebears left you,/you first must earn
and merit their possession.”35 T. S. Eliot writes: “Tradition […] cannot be inherited […] if
you want it  you must obtain it  by great labour” (Eliot  1919:  4).  In Cavell’s  words,  “I
suppose one inherits in philosophy only what one must recognize as one’s own” (Cavell
1980: 143). These authors are addressing in a constructive vein what Harold Bloom (1975)
terms “anxiety of influence.” But such a phrase misses the sense in which influence could
also be a blessing, a revelation, an in-flux of novel insights from a hitherto unknown
source. It is one of the unique merits of Emersonian moral perfectionism that it brings to
the fore the dilemma between the self and the other, without suggesting that caring for
my soul would in any way contradict my caring for the Other.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics [EN], Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Emersonian Moral Perfectionism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
15
BATES S., (2003), Stanley Cavell and Ethics, in R. Eldridge (ed.), Stanley Cavell, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 15-47.
BLOOM H., (1975), The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry, London, Oxford University Press.
CAVELL S., (1958), The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy, in Must We Mean What We Say? A
Book of Essays. Updated Edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, 44-72.
CAVELL S., (1964), Existentialism and Analytical Philosophy, in Themes out of School: Effects and Causes,
San Francisco, North Point Press, 1984, 195-234.
CAVELL S., (1979), Thinking of Emerson, in The Senses of Walden. An Expanded Edition, Chicago-London,
University of Chicago Press, 1992, 121-38.
CAVELL S., (1980), An Emerson Mood, in The Senses of Walden. An Expanded Edition, Chicago-London,
University of Chicago Press, 1992, 139-60.
CAVELL S., (1987), Freud and Philosophy: A Fragment, in Critical Inquiry 13, 386-93. 
CAVELL S., (1989), This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein,
Albuquerque, Living Batch Press.
CAVELL S., (1990), Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism,
Chicago-London, University of Chicago Press.
CAVELL S., (1994), A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises, Cambridge-London, Harvard
University Press.
CAVELL S., (1995), Emerson’s Constitutional Amending: Reading “Fate,” in Philosophical Passages:
Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida, Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers, 12-41.
CAVELL S., (2004), Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life, Cambridge-
London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
CAVELL S., (2008), Interview with Stanley Cavell by H. A. Kovalainen, partly published in Finnish
translation by the interviewer in niin & näin 4, 8-15.
CONANT J., (1997), “Emerson as Educator,” in ESQ: A Journal of the American Renaissance: Emerson /
Nietzsche [special issue, published in 1998], 43 (1-4), 181-206.
CONANT J., (2001), “Nietzsche’s Perfectionism: A Reading of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’,” in R.
Schacht (ed.), Nietzsches Postmoralism. Essays on Nietzsche’s Prelude to Philosophys Future, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 181-257.
CUKOR G., (1940), The Philadelphia Story, Warner Bros (DVD), 2005.
DIAMOND C., (1991), The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, Cambridge, MA, MIT
Press.
ELIOT T.S., (1964 [1919]), Tradition and Individual Talent, in Selected Essays, New York, Harcourt,
Brace & World.
EMERSON R.W., (1971-), The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson [Complete Works, vol. 1-8], 8
vols., ed. by R.E. Spiller et al., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
GOETHE J. W.V. (1808), Faust. Eine Tragödie. [Erster Theil.], Goethes Werke [Weimarer Ausgabe,
W.A.], I Abtheilung (Literarische Werke 1749-1832), 14. Band. Translated as Faust I by Stuart
Atkins (Cambridge, MA, Suhrkamp/Insel Publishers Boston, 1984).
Emersonian Moral Perfectionism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
16
GOODMAN R. B., (1997), Moral Perfectionism and Democracy in Emerson and Nietzsche, in ESQ: A Journal
of the American Renaissance: Emerson / Nietzsche [special issue, published in 1998], 43 (1-4), 159-80.
HEGEL G. W. F., (1970 [1807]), Phänomenologie des Geistes, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp. Trans. as 
Phenomenology of Spirit by A. V. Miller, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977.
HEIDEGGER M., (1993 [1927]), Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag. Trans. as Being and
Time by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, New York, Harper & Row, 1962.
HEIDEGGER M., (2000 [1946]), Brief über den “Humanismus” in Wegmarken, translated as Letter on
Humanism by F.A. Capuzzi, Pathmarks, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
HURKA T., (1993), Perfectionism, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press.
HURKA T., (1998), Perfectionism, in Craig E. (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (CD-ROM),
London, Routledge.
IBSEN H., (2009 [1879]), A Doll’s House, Rockville, Serenity Publishers.
JAMES W., (1985 [1902]), The Varieties of Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press.
KATEB G., (1995), Emerson and Self-Reliance, Thousand Oaks-London-New Delhi, Sage Publications.
KAUFMANN W., (1974), Translator’s Introduction, in Nietzsche F., The Gay Science, transl. Walter 
KAUFMANN, New York-Toronto, Vintage Books.
KOJÈVE A., (1947), Introduction à la lecture de Hegel. Leçons sur la Phénomenologie de l’Esprit professes de
1933 à 1939 à l’École des Hautes Études réunies et publiées par Raymond Queneau, Paris, Gallimard.
Translated as Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Lectures on The Phenomenology of Spirit, Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1990.
KUUSELA O., (2008), The Struggle against Dogmatism: Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy,
Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
LAUGIER S., (2002), Emerson: Penser l’ordinaire, Revue Française d’Études Américaines, 91 (1), 43-60.
LEVINAS E., (1989), The Levinas Reader, edited by S. Hand, Oxford, Blackwell.
MULHALL S., (1994), Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
MULHALL S., (1996a), Introduction, in Mulhall, S. (ed.), The Cavell Reader, Cambridge, Blackwell
Publishers, 1-21.
MULHALL S., (1996b), Moral Perfectionism, in Mulhall S. (ed.), The Cavell Reader, Cambridge, Blackwell
Publishers, 353-4.
MURDOCH I., (2001 [1970]), The Sovereignty of Good, London, Routledge.
NANCY J.-L., (1996), L’‘éthique originaire’ de Heidegger in La pensée dérobée, Paris, Galilée, 2001, 85-113.
Translated as Heidegger’s “Originary Ethics” by D. Large, Studies in Practical Philosophy, 1 (1), 1999,
12-35.
NEIMAN A., (1999), “Logic and Sin: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Education at the Limits of
Language,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 18, 339-349.
NIETZSCHE F., (1874a), Schopenhauer als Erzieher. In Unzeitgemäße Betrachtung III, Band 1 der
Kritischen Studienausgabe, 1999, 335-427.
NIETZSCHE F., (1999 [1874b]), Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben, in Unzeitgemäße
Betrachtung II, Band 1 der Kritischen Studienausgabe, 243-334.
Emersonian Moral Perfectionism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
17
NIETZSCHE F., (1999 [1882]), Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Neue Ausgabe mit einem Anhange: Lieder des
Prinzen Vogelfrei (Band 3 der Kritischen Studienausgabe).
RAÏD L., (2002), “Self-Reliance et L’Éthique de Wittgenstein,” Revue Française d’Études Américaines,
91 (1), 87-96.
RAWLS J., (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
SAITO N., (2001), “Reconstructing Deweyan Pragmatism in Dialogue with Emerson and Cavell,” 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 37 (3), 389-406.
SAITO N., (2004), The Gleam of Light: Moral Perfectionism and Education in Dewey and Emerson, New
York, Fordham University Press.
STIEVERMANN J., (2007), Der Sündenfall der Nachahmung: Zum Problem der Mittelbarkeit im Werk Ralph
Waldo Emersons, Paperborn, Schönigh.
VAN CROMPHOUT G., (1999), Emerson’s Ethics, Columbia-London, University of Missouri Press.
WITTGENSTEIN L., (1997 [1953]), Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations, Transl. G.
E. M. Anscombe (German-English Edition), Oxford, Blackwell Publischers.
NOTES
1. Throughout my discussion, the term ‘perfectionism,’ unless otherwise mentioned, refers to
Emersonian moral perfectionism as opposed to perfectionism in the everyday sense (or the standard
meaning  of  moral  perfectionism,  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  second  section  below).  The
expression ‘Emersonian perfectionism’ is used as another shortcut for Cavell’s Emersonian moral
perfectionism.
2. In addition to the three lectures dealing with perfectionism from various points of view, the
book contains a thirty-page introduction and a thirty-page (!)  preface, and curiously enough,
many of the most important insights are expressed in these introductory chapters.
3. What I will be suggesting in this paragraph, then, goes beyond what Cavell himself explicitly
says.  In an interview of  his  philosophy,  however,  I  had a chance to test  the claims I  will  be
making, instigating Cavell to comment: I think that’s very fair, I think that’s an awfully good way to
think about it.  The interview (2008) is largely unpublished; see the bibliography for additional
information.
4. The  concept  of  the  ordinary,  as  used  by  Cavell,  designates  generally  things  belonging  to
ordinary  life:  ordinary  language,  ordinary  activities,  the  “commonness”  of  life.  In  this  light,
Stephen Mulhall’s book on Cavell, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (1994), is
appropriately named.
5. For accessible general  works,  see particularly Murdoch 1970;  Levinas 1989;  Diamond 1991;
Nancy 1996. In what follows, however, my remarks will be mostly confined to Cavell, Heidegger,
and Wittgenstein, thus hoping to avoid excessive swelling of my subject.
6. This raises the question concerning the relationship between Emersonian perfectionism and
the problem of normativity: if perfectionism refuses to call itself an ethics, how might it have
normative bearing in the first  place? The short answer is  that we are interested in morality
rather than moralism (see Bates 2003). I will come back to this; let me now only mention that
Cavell  highlights  often  and  in  various  ways  the  inseparability  of  different  branches  of
philosophy; see, in particular Cavell (1990: xxix, 2, 5, 7, 46, 61; 1989: 10-1, 40; 1995: 28).
7. I will come back to this in the final section below.
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8. Stephen Mulhall (1996a: 14) is right, I think, in making the general observation that Cavell’s
Emersonian perfectionism is centrally indebted to Heidegger.
9. Heidegger repeatedly underscores that he does not wish to make value judgments as to which
kind of life, an authentic or an inauthentic one, would be better or more worthwhile (Heidegger
1927: 113-30); and in fact, the authentic life is an “existentiell modification” of the inauthentic
life,  and not vice versa (Heidegger 1927: 130).  This can be linked to his general emphasis on
phenomenology’s dealing not with the “what” but the “how” of experience (Heidegger 1927: 27).
10. See, for instance, Mulhall 1994; Neiman 1999; Laugier 2002; Raïd 2002.
11. Such  a  reading  comes  close  to  that  developed  by  Oskari  Kuusela,  who  argues  that  the
resistance of the later Wittgenstein to presenting philosophical theses has essentially to do with
his struggle to keep philosophy free from dogmatism (Kuusela 2008).
12. My procedure for citing Emerson is to name the volume of the Collected (or Complete) Works,
followed by an abbreviation of the essay title cited, and the page number(s).
13. While I sympathize with a perfectionist interpretation of Emerson, I am by no means among
those  (such  as  Cavell)  thinking  that  we  should  downplay  the  proto-pragmatistic  strains  in
Emerson. My PhD dissertation Self as World – The New Emerson (due for publication as a book in the
near future) contains an elaborate discussion of both Emersonian perfectionism and Emersonian
pragmatism; for another persuasive synthesis, consult Saito 2004.
14. In his analysis Rawls abandons moderate perfectionism and hence perfectionism in general as
being incompatible with democracy (Rawls 1971: 325-30). For critical commentary, consult Cavell
(1990: 1-32, 48); Hurka 1993; Mulhall (1994: 268-9); Goodman 1997; Conant 2001.
15. See  Nietzsche  (1874a:  384-5);  Cavell  (1990:  48-53);  Mulhall  (1994:  268-9).  In  the  case  of
Nietzsche, we may indeed raise the question as to what extent he is – forgetting the stereotypes –
really an elitist thinker. For example Conant (2001) and Goodman (1997) persuasively argue that
Nietzsche’s perfectionism is not nearly as elitist as has often been suggested.
16. For  various  commentaries  on  the  relationship  between  Emersonian  perfectionism  and
democracy, see Cavell (1990: 3); Conant (1997: 184); Saito (2001: 396-7); Mulhall (1994: 268-70);
Goodman  (1997:  174-7).  For  a  fruitful  approach  on  related  themes  not  directly  related  to
perfectionism, consult Kateb 1995.
17. Although  Cavell  draws  himself  apart  from  the  standard  definition  of  perfectionism,  his
perfectionism maintains some important  ties  to non-Emersonian perfectionism.  According to
Hurka,  perfectionism  in  the  standard  sense  of  the  term  lays  emphasis  not  only  our  duties
towards  others  but  also  towards  ourselves,  and perfectionism is  the  foundation of  all  ethics
(Hurka 1993: 5, 190; 1998).
18. The denial of Emersonian moral perfectionism’s being a teleological theory leaves out, so a
critic might argue, the possibility that the “perfection” envisaged in perfectionism amounts not
to a lack of telos whatsoever, but only a telos that would be attainable. I  note in passing that
certain religiously inclined thinkers may regard the very striving for an unattainable telos as the
ultimate meaning of human existence. If this makes sense, then Cavellian perfectionism may be
seen as somewhat akin to religious perfectionism, which Cavell himself never explicitly denies.
19. See Cavell (1990: xxxi, 2, 62; 1994: 142). Good commentaries are Mulhall (1994: 279-82; 1996b:
353); Saito 2004.
20. Cavell faces the question in (1990: 2).
21. Aristotle uses the phrase (or to be precise, the phrase “another himself”) a couple of times in
the Book IX of Nicomachean Ethics. See Aristotle, Ethics, 1166a, 1170b.
22. In my view – though I cannot take up the subject in any detail here – Emerson’s affinity with
Hegel (and arguably Fichte and Schelling) could be crucial for a better understanding of his stripe
of  perfectionism.  Indirect  evidence for  this  is  provided by the observation that  some of  the
French followers  of  Hegel,  most  famously  Alexandre  Kojève,  deal  with  topics  a  Cavellian
philosopher will easily recognize as (also) Emersonian-perfectionist. I mention as examples the
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recognition of oneself in an Other, and the related desire to transform one’s particularity into
universality, what ultimately amounts to the meaning of life. (See Kojève, in particular, 1939:
11-34.) For Hegel’s theory of recognition, see Hegel 1807; for some observations on Emerson’s
Hegelian strands, consult Stievermann (2007: 315-9).
23. As perhaps the best candidates for Emersonian texts stressing the importance of rapture and
losing one’s self, I might mention “Circles” (CW 2: circ 1841, 177-90) and “Inspiration” (CW 8: insp
1875, 267-97). Cavell’s references to the former are scanty, to the latter nonexistent.
24. See The Philadelphia Story (Cukor 1940).
25. See Cavell (1995: 26, 1990: xxxii, 59; 2004: 15-6, 27); Saito (2001: 395).
26. This can be seen, for instance, in the following text from the later essay “Education”: “In
some sort the end of life is that the man should take up the universe into himself, or out of that
quarry leave nothing unrepresented. Yonder mountain must migrate into his mind” (CW 10: ed
1884, 131; emphasis added).
27. Thus Stephen Mulhall (1994: 338) appropriately characterizes Emersonian perfectionism as a
notion of a “conception of the self  as inherently divided between its attained and attainable
states and in need of an Exemplar” – a friend or a favorite author – “to help it manage the shift
from the former to the latter.”
28. I have to admit to being unable to find the reference for this admirable pun (though I still
recall it comes from Cavell). Cavell’s lectures on perfectionism (1990) make the point in broader
brush strokes.
29. In an interview with Cavell by the current author, he formulated the matter as follows: “In
some awful way, I have to confess, I don’t care if I have to distinguish between what I can in a scholarly way
prove Emerson meant and what I feel I can get out of it if I mean it. I’m philosophizing reading Emerson,
and I think he wants me to, and when I find work that leaves the thing sort of dead for me on the page,
again I know I cringe from this.” This part of the interview is unpublished (cf. Cavell 2008).
30. My reading of Cavell’s non-religiosity stands in an intriguing tension with Stephen Mulhall’s
interpretation that the question of religion is, for Cavell, ultimately “the most fundamental and
so the most revealing of his preoccupations” (Mulhall 1994: 285). While Mulhall is, of course, well
aware of Cavell’s own proclivity to acquiescence with respect to religion, he stresses the more
than arbitrary parallels between the Cavellian philosophical project and Christianity. This makes
it even more ironic, indeed, that Cavell has so little to say on religion in his forays into Emerson.
31. Yet  a  further  subsidiary  question  concerns  the  therapeutic  aspect  of  Emersonian
perfectionism,  evidenced  by  Cavell’s  paramount  references  to  Freud  in  his  dealings  with
perfectionism (see the lecture “Freud” in Cavell’s second book on perfectionism (2004: 282-300);
see  also  Cavell  1987).  Cavell  seems  to  be  worried  by  Freud’s  refusal  to  see  his  project  of
psychoanalytic  therapy as intimately related to philosophy – perhaps a worry Cavell  himself
would identify with, for he might well feel related concerns – or, in the framework of Cavell’s
own project, by his philosophy possibly lacking the therapeutic weight it ought to carry.
32. Indeed, Murdoch’s book is thematically perhaps closer to Cavell’s work than any other text
known to me; it is also the work that Cavell mentions first,  while drawing attention to texts
related to his own project, in his preface to the lectures on perfectionism (Cavell 1990). The other
authors he mentions are Annette Baier, G. E. M. Anscombe, Cora Diamond, Philippa Foot, Alasdair
MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, and Peter Winch.
33. See Cavell (1990: xviii-xvxix). For the original version of the story, consult Murdoch 1970.
34. For the original list in its entirety, see Cavell (1990: 5).
35. “Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast / Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen.” (Goethe 1808 / W.A. I
14., 39.) For central Emerson commentators dealing with the matters discussed in this paragraph,
see Cavell (1990: 1-32); Conant 1997; Goodman 1997; Van Cromphout 1999; Stievermann 2007.
Emersonian Moral Perfectionism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
20
ABSTRACTS
Stanley  Cavell’s  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism  is  not  a  compete  theory  of  moral  philosophy
alongside utilitarianism or deontology; it seeks to get a grip of a dimension in any moral thinking,
less of a hierarchy of what to value most in life and more a sketch on how we come to value
anything in the first place. Emersonian perfectionism tries to understand what it means to be a
moral subject, an authentic self, and to do this it cannot stay solely within the conventional sub-
disciplinary boundaries of philosophy. First and foremost, Cavell intends his outlook as a way of
discovering  the  philosophical  uniqueness  of  Emersonian  thought;  he  asks  us  to  take  very
seriously what Emerson has to say on the self and its coming to itself. But such themes are never
confined within the narrow framework of  a  particular  author,  essayist  or  a  poet,  and Cavell
traces related topics in works of art as diverse as Ibsen’s Doll House and the poetry of Whitman,
philosophers as seemingly distant as Wittgenstein and Heidegger.
While Cavell is oftentimes suggestive rather than elaborate on the relevance of Wittgenstein and
Heidegger for his version of moral perfectionism, a critical reader ought to spell out the senses in
which the two thinkers are essential to the perfectionist project. In brief, neither one of them had
much to say on ethics by way of explicit commentary, yet both of them have given rise to a host
of reasonable studies in ethics,  following them. Thus philosophers like Cora Diamond and Iris
Murdoch  have  made  their  name  drafting  a  new  kind  of  ethics,  sometimes  bluntly  dubbed
Wittgensteinian moral philosophy, and authors such as Emmanuel Levinas and Jean Luc-Nancy
have done the same in the Heideggerian footsteps, drawing attention to his “originary ethics.”
The  key  issue  regarding  the  aforementioned  exemplars  in  moral  philosophy,  and  arguably
Emersonian ethics, is that they speak to ethical issues without explicitly addressing ethics; they
touch on something crucial to our ethical conduct without laying out ethical norms. They are not
so much interested in the normativity of ethics in the first place. They seem to grasp that ethics
has to do with something more fundamental, perhaps something like an original encounter with
the being of the world, a genuine attentiveness to the particularity of our experience, rendering
ethics possible in the first place. Such an outlook on morality may not be unambiguously called
ethics, at least not as something separate from epistemology and ontology, yet its affinities with
contemporary moral philosophy are wide-ranging, in particular, with the work of Iris Murdoch.
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